The Stig
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Post by The Stig on Jan 2, 2010 15:56:10 GMT -5
I don't disagree with the NYT editorial, but they make it seem like intel sharing and putting the pieces together is as easy as putting together a 4 piece jigsaw puzzle. It's not that simple. This is a classic case of having all the right intel, but not putting it all together. The same thing happened for Pearl Harbor, the same thing happened for 9/11. Both times you had major improvements to the system after the disaster, but problems persisted. People are acting like Abdulmutallab was the only person our intel agencies should have been watching. The reality is that before Christmas he was a minor nobody, one of thousands of people around the world that our intel agencies were keeping an eye on. Aside from one warning by his father, there was nothing concrete to indicate he was a threat, and there were actually plenty of signs to indicate that he was harmless. There was a mention of a Nigerian in Yemen, but there are quite a few Nigerians out there. Take this paragraph from the editorial: "Long before Mr. Abdulmutallab was allowed to board that flight to Detroit, some analyst should have punched “Nigerian, Abdulmutallab, Yemen, visa, plot” into the system. We are still waiting to find out whether Britain told Washington that it had revoked the suspect’s visa. Shouldn’t that have been on file?" That would have been easy to do if we had a single analyst dedicated to tracking Abdulmutallab, if Abdulmutallab were the only Nigerian ever to travel to Yemen, and the only person to ever get rejected for a British visa. But that's simply not the case. My Georgetown roommate's Pakistani girlfriend got turned down for a British visa, does that mean she should be permanently banned from the US? There are also other reasons why intel cant be shared. People say that since Abdulmutallab fit the classic terrorist check-in profile (flying alone, no luggage, paying in cash), he should have been automatically screened against our terror watch lists. But he checked in in Ghana and maybe in Nigeria as well. Do we really want to give those countries access to our terror watch lists? Nigeria's an incredibly corrupt country with lots of angry Muslims. It wouldn't be hard at all for Al Qaeda to pay somebody off and start running names through the system to see which of their people are red flagged. Are there flaws in the system that can be fixed? Of course. But there's not nearly as much low-hanging fruit as people are pretending there is. To give credit where it's due, the last administration took care of most of that. But in the end, intel agencies and security systems can only do so much. The only way to be absolutely sure that our commercial aviation system is never attacked again is this: www.theonion.com/content/node/27687
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Post by redskins12820 on Jan 2, 2010 16:38:30 GMT -5
This is a classic case of having all the right intel, but not putting it all together. Ok this keeps bothering me. Did we have the right intel? We had a father saying he thought his son was radicalized, but no specifics beyond that, and no indication of any planned attack. One person's statement. Then, the intercepts about a "Nigerian." Is this enough information? I honestly have no clue how many of these "radicalization" reports there are. Can we just ban people from flying when one person (albeit a parent) files a report saying someone is radicalized, but there is no other proof? Is that really enough? I can just imagine some bitter enemy filing a report in XYZ country to screw over someone who got the best of them in a business deal (maybe a slight exaggeration there, but you get the point). Also, as a sidenote, I don't totally get the no fly list. Presumably AQ has access to the list, or at least can figure out if their bomber is on the list. Couldn't they just choose someone else to do the job if the first guy they train gets put onto the list? It seems like the list is just a temporary obstacle and won't offer protection over the long term. Are there any documented cases of someone being on the "no fly list" or the "heightened screening" list and getting caught with explosive materials?
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hoyaalf
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Post by hoyaalf on Jan 2, 2010 17:01:49 GMT -5
Stig<
Your Onion link provides precisely what I propose for the duration.
Screw the tourist economy. Why should people frolic during a war for civilization?
S for broadening minds, the River CitybKibrary works for me.
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The Stig
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Post by The Stig on Jan 2, 2010 17:08:31 GMT -5
Enough intel to arrest/detain the guy? Probably not, although there were people at Gitmo on a lot less evidence. But I think we had enough intel to deny his visa.
As for the no-fly list, Al Qaeda could do as you say, but it still helps. The reason nobody got hurt on the flight at Christmas appears to be that Abdulmutallab didn't really know what he was doing. I don't know for sure, but I think that a well-trained terrorist would have had a much better chance of setting off that bomb successfully, and at the right time (over the ocean). The No Fly List makes Al Qaeda take guys off the street for these missions, increasing the chance of screw-ups like this one.
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SSHoya
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Post by SSHoya on Jan 2, 2010 17:10:05 GMT -5
We had the right intel. That's why Pres. Obama is asking for a thorough review of the systemic failure (his words) that allowed a terrorist to board an airplane and attempt to ignite an incendiary device.
As a general matter, AQ does not have access to the no fly list per se, which is maintained by DHS and is considered sensitive but not classified as that term is used in the USIC. As I noted in my previous post, AQ is seeking "clean" candidates who have multiple entry visas from the US who would not come up on a selectee or no fly list. There have been many suspected terrorists barred from entry but since that is the case there would be no confirmation that any particular plot was thwarted. I am unaware of a specific documented case that discovered someone through secondary screening.
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Post by redskins12820 on Jan 2, 2010 18:37:46 GMT -5
As a general matter, AQ does not have access to the no fly list per se, which is maintained by DHS and is considered sensitive but not classified as that term is used in the USIC. Yes, obviously the list is not broadcasted, but presumably AQ can place someone at a ticket counter in a single airport at some international airport in the world. Or you just dry run someone beforehand with no equipment to see if they're on the list. In effect, they have the list.
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Post by jerseyhoya34 on Jan 2, 2010 22:21:41 GMT -5
Agree 100% with Stig.
I think our airlines can afford to adopt an El Al model since passenger comfort and amenities are mostly a thing of the past and lag well behind many European airlines. I think you'll find many passengers willing to go whole hog toward an El Al model if it means extra security, and they'll gladly forego an opportunity to pay additional money for a "meal" or "snack" on a US airliner. I'd give up another soda, no doubt, if the cost could go toward extra security.
As long as we see the trade-off as between security and our economy, we'll be assuming some risk on both sides. This means we'll have the occasional underwear bomber or opportunistic attack that seeks to exploit the security areas that we have declined to tighten up due to cost issues or that can be exploited in any event.
One other problem we face is that there is simply not the same level of pride in US airlines/security as in certain other parts of the world. You can bet that Air France is highly-regarded among the French, and they take seriously how the airline treats passengers.* It is an honor/duty to serve as part of El Al's security. It is a dishonor to be associated with TSA baggage screening in Detroit. Compare also to most any Philadelphian's opinion of US Airways (or security lines in Terminal C), opinions of Continental in Newark, opinions of US Airways in Charlotte, opinions of Atlanta's airport let alone Delta, etc. I submit that Americans are less loyal to airlines, perhaps because of there being more options generally, and there is a level of "I don't care as long as it gets the job done." Why not cater to that?
We're also our own worst enemy in this airport security thing. Tonight's NBC News featured a story that disclosed what kinds of state-of-the-art screening techniques are being used and where. Hours after the Detroit incident, the Ranking Member of House Intelligence disclosed important details about the status of our intelligence as to the attack, and I have to think that this and other reporting has been valuable to cells in Yemen. They are now more able to identify their exposure and who has not been revealed to our intelligence teams. I firmly believe having a permanent, confirmed head of a security agency does more good than bad and makes us more secure (even if only slightly). All this also goes to the information divide discussed up thread.
As I read more about this, I just do not see how DHS is to blame for actual, as opposed to beltway political, problems in the Detroit incident. You have a basic intelligence problem, and a lack of DHS authority to deal with it. Secretary Napolitano made the mistake of allowing herself to be sliced and diced in our soundbyte culture by appearing on television, but I am hard-pressed to identify where she takes the heat as opposed to the people who limited the dissemination of underlying intelligence.
* I have been to several airports over the past year and can report that security was the strongest in CDG. They were pulling aside 50% of passengers for a quick 5 minute interview just after the normal metal detector/conveyor belt stuff. This was blind insofar as the security pulling folks aside had not seen your passport or other identifying documents. I found the interview intrusive, which is what you need/want out of something like airport security. But, what do we need to learn from them? They are French, after all.
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theexorcist
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Post by theexorcist on Jan 2, 2010 22:32:09 GMT -5
Ambassador:
DHS is responsible for airport and airplane security (through TSA). DHS has its own intelligence directorate. If DHS isn't responsible for making sure a guy who wants to blow up an airplane gets on the plane, what are they responsible for?
Oh, and CDG is nothing compared to Tel Aviv. I've never been questioned for less than fifteen minutes, and they unpack everyone's bags.
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Post by jerseyhoya34 on Jan 2, 2010 22:46:42 GMT -5
Ambassador: DHS is responsible for airport and airplane security (through TSA). DHS has its own intelligence directorate. If DHS isn't responsible for making sure a guy who wants to blow up an airplane gets on the plane, what are they responsible for? The problem, as I see it, and correct me if I'm wrong, but DHS did not have the intelligence data here as far as we know. It was given to State via the father's disclosure, and CIA may have had a nugget or two, which seems to be of the "some Nigerian" ilk. It seems counterintuitive then to put heat on DHS when there was at least something which was not acted upon in CIA and State. As far as I know, DHS is also not responsible for airport security in Nigeria, Ghana, and the Netherlands. The screening techniques of those governments failed to expose the would-be bomber. We're basically down to a situation where DHS is then held responsible for preventing someone from getting on a plane overseas without having any actionable intelligence under its roof (and based on intelligence it does not know that it does not have) as to the person or any capacity to screen the passenger in an airport overseas before flight or in transit. There would almost have to be a presumption against everyone on a plane in such circumstances, which is closer to an El Al model and would certainly be injurious to our economy.
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DFW HOYA
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Post by DFW HOYA on Jan 2, 2010 23:02:00 GMT -5
Putting aside El Al's ethnic profiling techniques, the sheer scope of developing a similar effort on an airline by airline basis would be infeasible in the US.
El Al spends $100 million a year on its own to secure a fleet of just 37 planes. The six major US airlines fly over 3,000 planes in their collective fleets. Extapolating the El Al figure, that would be approx. $10 billion a year in added costs for an industry that is already scheduled to lose $9 billion in 2009.
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The Stig
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Post by The Stig on Jan 2, 2010 23:20:18 GMT -5
Ambassador: DHS is responsible for airport and airplane security (through TSA). DHS has its own intelligence directorate. If DHS isn't responsible for making sure a guy who wants to blow up an airplane gets on the plane, what are they responsible for? Oh, and CDG is nothing compared to Tel Aviv. I've never been questioned for less than fifteen minutes, and they unpack everyone's bags. Because the standards for letting people fly are much lower than the standards for letting somebody get a visa to the US. Based on the publicly available information, there probably wasn't enough evidence against Abdulmutallab to ban him from flying. However, there probably was enough evidence, or at least questions, to keep him from getting a US visa. State is responsible for visas, not DHS. And TSA doesn't run airport security operations in Ghana, Nigeria, and the Netherlands. You can't really blame TSA for letting a guy on a plane with explosives when TSA never screened him. That said, TSA still has some major problems. The most notable is the lack of a TSA Administrator. Jim DeMint is holding up Obama's nominee in the Senate because the Administration hasn't pledged to ban TSA workers from forming a union.
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Post by jerseyhoya34 on Jan 3, 2010 0:50:38 GMT -5
Putting aside El Al's ethnic profiling techniques, the sheer scope of developing a similar effort on an airline by airline basis would be infeasible in the US. El Al spends $100 million a year on its own to secure a fleet of just 37 planes. The six major US airlines fly over 3,000 planes in their collective fleets. Extapolating the El Al figure, that would be approx. $10 billion a year in added costs for an industry that is already scheduled to lose $9 billion in 2009. As to the economic argument, there are a few responses. First, when El Al outfitted many of its planes, it was owned by the government, so there's a good chance some of that money came from government coffers. We could do the same thing here. $10 billion/year is a drop in the bucket when compared to the annual cost of the Bush tax cuts, the monthly cost of the Iraq War, the cost of the competitive health care option, and so forth. Second, as consumers, we already pay or are supposed to pay for some airport security, and airlines pass some of the cost on to us through checked baggage fees. The approximate breakdown of $10 billion/year. In the first 9 months of 2006, roughly 562 million people flew in the US (domestic and to/from US). Adjusting for 12 months, that comes out to 749 million. The cost of the security change would be $13.35 per passenger, well below the cost of checking a bag. (This assumes our math is correct and that air travel has not increased over the past 3 years, among other things. I am just running with the numbers I could find. I also don't know if I'm dealing with a count of unique passengers or a list that counts unique passengers multiplied by their number of air trips) I would submit that airlines could easily bury this fee in ticket prices or pitch it as an add-on fee if the returns are as identifiable and successful as those of El Al security. The political issue holds more water in my mind because it is clear that racial profiling is controversial here. No easy answers. I just come down to the idea that it happens in any event. I'm sure if you took our no-fly list, you'd find garden variety radicals from every country imaginable. The bulk of the list, however, would not be cottage dwellers from the Scottish Highlands. They are likely to be folks who claim to be Muslims and who hail from the Middle East and North Africa or, at the very least, folks who claim to be Muslims. There is no uproar over this, nor should there be given who tends to hijack planes bound for targets in the United States. A more active and identifiable profiling effort, however, may lead to controversy.
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The Stig
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Post by The Stig on Jan 3, 2010 11:04:55 GMT -5
There are also plenty of non-threatening people on the no-fly list. A girl from my high school somehow got on it, along with the rest of her family. They went to court a few years go, changed their family name, and now they can fly again.
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hoyaalf
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Post by hoyaalf on Jan 3, 2010 11:24:35 GMT -5
That's nice, but not very re-assuring.
I think if God had wanted us to fly, we would have been born with credit cards.
Thank you all for a stimulating and well-informed discussion.
Keep it up, Hoyas!
Lead the way!
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SSHoya
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Post by SSHoya on Jan 3, 2010 12:38:24 GMT -5
It gets worse. Britain, one of our strongest allies on the "war against terrorism" had knowledge of Abdulmulltalub's contacts with radical Islamist while he was a student in Britain. This information was not shared with the USIC: www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6973954.eceVery specific rules govern use and dissemination of foreign intelligence information between US and its allies. I wonder whether those rules were followed in this case, and in the event they were, need they be reviewed>
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The Stig
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Post by The Stig on Jan 3, 2010 13:41:29 GMT -5
Well, I guess that explains why he was denied for a British visa when he tried to go back.
If DoS had asked the Brits why his visa application was denied, this info might have come out. But I don't really see any other reason why the Brits would share this. There are probably hundreds, if not thousands of British youths who have some sort of contact with radicals while they're over there. This sort of info is pretty unremarkable on its own. It only becomes remarkable when the person involved tries to blow up a plane.
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SSHoya
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Post by SSHoya on Jan 3, 2010 14:07:14 GMT -5
But contrast the British response with the US response to his father going to the US Embassy in Lagos and reporting radicalization of his son to a diplomatic official and, reportedly, a CIA officer. The US didn't even bother to check whether he had a US visa. Had they done so, they would have discovered the multiple entry visa and that, perhpas, could have led to greater investigation, other than belatedly putting him in TIDE.
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The Stig
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Post by The Stig on Jan 3, 2010 21:14:32 GMT -5
Very true. But getting back to the original comments in this thread, both the embassy info from his father and the visa are State Department issues, not DHS.
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Cambridge
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Post by Cambridge on Jan 3, 2010 22:31:43 GMT -5
I can report that there was no extra security flying back from the Dominican Republic yesterday other than a casual check at the gate which I somehow avoided. BTW, as with most countries you don't have to remove your shoes, take your laptop out of your bag or remove liquids from your bag flying from the DR...so, as much as we want to think we can secure our airways, as long as flights are coming in from abroad we will always be vulnerable as I'm sure the DR is not alone in their lax security.
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SSHoya
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Post by SSHoya on Jan 4, 2010 8:49:43 GMT -5
Stig,
Agree that visa status is a USDOS issue and in earlier post I noted that people were wrongly focusing on DHS because of Napolitano's statemetns. Theoretically, consular officers are USG's firsline defense against the admission of terrorists to US. A more robust response when a seemingly credible individual such as the father in this case has relatively specific information might have made a difference. I can't imagine that many parents are showing up at US Embassies and Consulates reporting that their son may be radicalized and has gone missing. To me, that must be a relatively unusual occurence and would call for a more urgent response on the part of USDOS.
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